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ELLICKSON'S EXTRAORDINARY LOOK AT THE ORDINARY
Henry E. Smith*
It is often said that the mark of great work, and a great theory in particular, is
that it seems obvious in retrospect. And among such theories, some of the most im-
pressive are those that aim to explain not just the problems dujour but also a range
of facts about life that we have tended to take for granted. In law and economics,
the Coase Theorem' seems self-evident now, and the situations it covers positively
homely, but at the time, against the backdrop of the idealizations and obsessions with
frictionless worlds of mid-twentieth century economics, it was anything but obvious.'
Not only did it take a night's worth of partying in Chicago to make converts there,3
but refutations of the Coase Theorem sprouted up for quite a while afterwards.4
Bob Ellickson's work has this character in both respects. That social norms can
be more important than-and can even override-contradictory law is now a staple
of legal theorizing.' And the hypothesis that close-knit communities will develop
efficient norms for themselves-but not necessarily efficient for society overall-is
leading to a better understanding of the dynamics of spontaneous order and its
strengths and sometime weaknesses.6 This and his study of the workings of property
itself,7 and now the household,' are of clear utility in retrospect. But all of these
aspects of Ellickson's work also share the second feature of a great theory: they
explain aspects of life that were taken for granted-were not even on the scholarly
radar screen- before Ellickson came along.
Now Ellickson considers himself more of a social scientist than a philosopher, but
this characteristic of his theorizing-the startling attention to something taken for
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Email: hesmith@law.harvard.edu.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
2 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 75-80 (1988).
See R.H. Coase, Law andEconomics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239,249-50 (1993);
STIGLER, supra note 2, at 75-76.
4 See, e.g., STEVEN G. MEDEMA, RONALD H. COASE 82-90 (1994) (providing an over-
view of literature claiming to refute the Coase Theorem).
' See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETLE
DISPUTES (1991).
6 See generally id. (describing a theory where people interact to mutual advantage without
help of a hierarchical coordinator).
' See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
8 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH
(2008) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD]; Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the
Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226 (2006) [herein-
after Ellickson, Unpacking the Household].
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granted-has characterized some of the greatest advances in philosophy and related
fields. The one with which I am the most familiar, linguistics, was revolutionized
starting in the 1950s when Noam Chomsky changed the goal of linguistics.9 Prior to
the advent of his generative grammar, linguistics was usually conducted as an off-
shoot of traditional grammar. Grammar focused on categories, like cases, subject-
object word order, and many more subtle ones, that had been useful in describing
Latin and related languages. These familiar categories were simply taken for granted,
and details of these basic features were modified relative to Latin as an implicit base-
line. Only when theorists took a step back and asked some very basic questions could
linguistic theory hope to move beyond school-grammar and aim at a theory of human
natural language competence in general. But the way to get there was to start noticing
the deep puzzles in some of the homely facts staring at us under our noses.'0 Like-
wise, a lot of very arcane analytic philosophy got its start when people started asking
questions about how ordinary language works or why we have our basic moral intui-
tions." The starting point for great theories is often sitting right in front of-or
within-us.
What makes Ellickson's work so impressive and inspiring for my own work is
exactly this character of putting the ordinary on the agenda in unexpected ways. Let
me discuss three major examples, and then how this method calls for some qualifi-
cation of another major theme of Ellickson's work-the irrelevance of law.
First is Ellickson's work on social norms. 12 In his study of Shasta County,
Ellickson's field work went well beyond demonstrating that people did not know or
care about law and that they worked things out among themselves in an efficient way.
He showed first of all, in great detail, that people often preferred simple solutions
over complex ones. Whether the prevailing legal regime was fencing in or fencing
out, the fact that the prevailing norm was responsibility by animal owners for inva-
sions of others' land suggests a powerful gravitational pull to the trespass model. 3
Not in the sense of the somewhat complicated rules of animal trespass, but the basic
regime of keep off, and out of, the column of space defined by the adcoelum rule.'4
9 See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957); Noam Chomsky, Skinner:
Verbal Behavior, 35 LANGUAGE 26 (1959) (book review).
'o For a discussion of Chomsky's impact on the field of linguistics, see FREDERICK
J. NEWMEYER, LINGUISTIC THEORY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1986). See also JOHN LYONS,
INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 136-37, 153-54 (1968); IAN HACKING, WHY
DOES LANGUAGE MATTER TO PHILOSOPHY? 67-69 (1975).
" See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); G.E. MOORE,
PRINCIPIA ETHICA (rev. ed. 1993); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
12 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 5.
13 Id. at 52-53, 72-76.
"' Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 388-91 (2001).
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Indeed, ad coelum thinking is very prevalent without anyone having to utter the
words "ad coelum."'5 Likewise, in whaling norms, the most prevalent norm is the
fast-fish-loose-fish rule made famous by Melville, 6 which accords with everyday
and widespread notions of possession and control. Only in more high-stakes envi-
ronments did whalers devise special rules.' 7
Ellickson also showed that people could deal with complexity best when their
interaction was close-knit.' Keeping a variety of accounts, in which favors were
traded but which could offset each other, is not an easy task, but that is the way people
behave. 9 This keeps formal transaction costs low but taps into complex behavior
at which people are skilled, perhaps because that is how we evolved, in groups of
a maximum of about 150 people.2" Governance rules based, as these are, on very
vague standards were not possible when it came to more anonymous interactions,
like automobile-animal collisions, which sometimes required the intervention of
insurance professionals and even the legal system.2'
In his work on property, Ellickson noticed details that are quite homely, but are
fundamental to how property, both legal and nonlegal, is organized. Ellickson is some-
times associated with the proposition that dogs are what made property possible-in
the sense that because of their territorial instincts, dogs can be trained to guard bound-
aries in an exclusion regime-ad coelum-but neither dogs nor robots can detect
shirking by someone with privileged access to a resource.22 The fact that exclusion
strategies are this simple to implement goes a long way toward explaining why they
are the starting point for property.23
The flip-side is that locally and among close-knit groups, more detail can be
tolerated. In his proposal to make local social norms the standard for nuisance law,
24
Ellickson follows a distinguished tradition of allowing custom to form the basis of
legal content but also in a way that legal institutions would find difficult to create and
" Id. at 389 n.131.
16 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 412 (Bantam Books 1967) (1851) ("I. A Fast-Fish
belongs to the party fast to it. II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch
it."); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 89-90 (1989).
'" Ellickson, supra note 16, at 90-94.
18 ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 167, 177-78.
'9 Id. at 55-56; Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, supra note 8, at 320.
20 See, e.g., R. I. M. Dunbar, Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language
in humans, 16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681 (1993); R. I. M. Dunbar, Neocortex Size as a
Constraint on Group Size in Primates, 22 J. HUMAN EVOLUTION 469 (1992).
21 ELLICKSON, supra note 5, at 94-100.
22 Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1329.
23 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454-56, S467-78 (2002).
24 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, andFines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728-33 (1973).
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apply directly. Indeed, Ellickson focuses attention on how the different scales of land-
use problems call for different regimes-in some self-irony he applies the "highly
sophisticated adjectives" to these events and the areas they affect-ranging from the
small event like the growing of a tomato plant, to the medium event like the building
of a small dam, to the large event like a fire that emits fumes over a large area.25 Be-
cause problems of scale sometimes call for different regimes to respond to them at
the same time, we face the thorny question of how different property regimes inter-
act with each other. This was the inspiration for my articles on the semicommons
in which small-scale grain growing uses and larger-scale grazing called for private
property and common property regimes that could damage each other through stra-
tegic behavior.26 Seeing that problems of scale require interlocking sets of solutions
will continue to be very fruitful for property theorists for a long while to come.
Most recently, Ellickson has focused on the household.2' The household itself
is quite easy to overlook despite the fact that each of us is a member of one. He rightly
distinguishes the household from the marriage and the family.28 In other societies,
medieval Iceland for example, the distinct character of the household-a group of
people who sleep under the same roof and share eating facilities-was quite distinct
from the family and the marriage. 2 The household is also full of rules that are surpris-
ingly simple, such as the equity owners of the house getting to set the rules for use.3"
Other behavior, like that of the cattle ranchers, is low in transaction costs but com-
plex in the application of social thinking. Exchange within the household occurs on
many fronts over a long period of time.3' Given a certain amount of self-servingness
on the part of members, it is quite remarkable that household members can rely on
implicit gift exchanges that will even out in the long run. 2 As with land ownership
in general, it will be very fruitful to show how regimes tailored to the individual, the
family, and the household interact.
Another mark of great work is that it throws new light on some of its initial
assumptions. Coase's insights can be turned on some of his assumptions.33 In his
view of property, Coase was a hyper-realist.34 He assumed that law regulated activi-
ties and that speaking of ownership merely confused things." In his treatment of
25 Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1325.
26 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
27 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD, supra note 8; Ellickson, Unpacking the
Household, supra note 8.
2 Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, supra note 8, at 229-30, 234-35.
29 Id. at 229-30, 257-61.
30 Id. at 277-87.
31 Id. at 306-07. See generally ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD, supra note 8.
32 Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, supra note 8, at 306-09.
13 Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 376-77.
14 id. at 366.
31 See id. at 366-75 (distinguishing Coase from the prototypical legal realist scholar).
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nuisance disputes he tended to regard every dispute as posing a freestanding eco-
nomic problem, at least in principle, and this certainly facilitated his insight about
reciprocal causation.36 Of course, as some warned us, including Bob Ellickson among
the very earliest, Coase was not asserting that transaction costs are zero, and the whole
point of the Coase Theorem is that transactions are important.37
If, in a zero transaction cost world, the allocation of an entitlement does not matter
to efficiency (holding effects like wealth constant) or, in a stronger version, to the
allocation of resources, the Coasean thought experiment points to the importance of
positive transaction costs in our actual world.3 In particular, positive transaction
costs not only make the allocation of the entitlement matter, but are the reason why
we always have to ask the comparative question of how best to handle problems in
the presence of transaction costs: what will maximize the benefits of solving such
problems net of the cost of solving them through contracts, taxes, regulations, or what-
ever. But this suggests that one such device is the shape of the entitlement itself:
property rights are not free-floating sticks and law does not always take the activity
as its unit of analysis. Property rights are often lumpy rights to exclude from things-
rights that sweep in a lot of unspecified uses.39 Owning Blackacre gives the right to
grow crops and to park cars, but not to pollute adjacent parcels, for which an ease-
ment is needed. This structure of entitlements causes and reflects a non-reciprocal
view of causation, but all of this is explainable in broad Coasean terms: transaction
costs, including information costs, prevent the hyper-realist bundle of rights theory
that might work in a world of zero transaction cost from coming close to reality in
our world."0
Similarly, Ellickson's work on social norms, property, and the household seems
to suggest that law is not important, and in a sense this is true.4 But in another sense,
the patterns of simplicity and complexity he found in social life, and the norms that
govern it, also apply in little-appreciated ways to law and the legal system itself-and
which suggests their importance after all. First, the basis for property in the right to
exclude from a thing resonates with a non-legal and pre-legal set of social intuitions
and morality.42 Even from within a law-and-economics paradigm, there are good
36 See id. at 391-94.
3 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Casefor Coase andAgainst "Coaseanism, " 99 YALE L.J.
611, 611-30 (1989).
3 See id. at 612-13 (showing how Coase adopted and amplified Legal Realist assumptions
about property).
39 See Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 69,
76 (2005).
o See generally id. (discussing the law of self-help).
41 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 5 (discussing the need for emphasis on social
norms).
42 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1849, 1860-66 (2007).
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information cost reasons for property to anchor itself to this set of social institutions.
Only in higher-stakes situations, especially new ones that come along from time to
time, do we need to refme this basic set-up.43 Sometimes this can be accomplished
by contract, and sometimes we need a set of group- or society-wide solutions. Butjust
as Ellickson critiqued legal centralism for being too focused on law, and not enough
on what actually governed social behavior, there is also a tendency to focus on fine-
grained solutions and rules of governance of proper uses-whether they be social
norms or laws-and to forget that these refinements stand at the apex of a pyramid
of institutions with basic order-maintaining exclusionary regimes of property at the
base.' Second, lay views of the world are more relevant to law than the legal cen-
tralist that Ellickson takes as his foil would admit.45 But this should not stop us from
analyzing law itself in terms of the information cost advantages of being in accord with
lay intuition. For example, Coase's reciprocity of causation is a brilliant theoretical
insight and utterly at odds with lay views of causation.' But before labeling the latter
as incorrect, we should recognize that in our world, questions are not as much up for
grabs as they are in a journal article. Both in law and, as Ellickson has shown, in
norms, our entitlements are quite lumpy, and this prevents us from seeing land use
and other conflicts as reciprocal.47 The assignment of lumpy entitlements means that
I get to repel all sorts of invasions without having to consult cost-benefit analysis or
any other complicated theory. The lumpy entitlement carries with it information cost
advantages and is presumptively the answer to the conflict, making it incorrect to say
that the lay view is incorrect. In this, the law and social norms dovetail quite closely.
Another way to extend Ellickson's approach would be to ask how law should re-
spond to social norms. The role of custom in law-or the role of custom as law-used
to be quite central.48 The more we can see the importance of social norms and detect
the conditions under which they are likely to be efficient and fair, the more that law
can benefit from spontaneous order.49 This approach would be quite traditional and
appealing to the lay mind. Just as norms were invisible to legal theorists for a long
time, there is a hidden part of the legal iceberg that Ellickson's type of extraordinary
attention to the ordinary can bring out into the open.
4 See Smith, supra note 23.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 398.
4- See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 5, 7-12 (2009).
46 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 14, at 391, 394; Merrill & Smith, supra note 42, at
1860-66.
47 ELL1CKSON, supra note 5, at 52-53, 72-76.
48 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 46, at 36-41 (discussing the importance of custom as
a baseline).
49 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 5.
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